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Abstract
This article considers the problem of utility maximization with an uncertain covariance matrix.
In contrast with the classical uncertain parameter approach, where the parameters of the model
evolve within a given range, we add a penalty function of the parameters. We show that this ro-
bust optimization process can be interpreted as a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game.
We prove that the value function satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle and that it is the
unique viscosity solution of an associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs equation. We test this
robust algorithm with 5 years’ empirical market data. The results show robust portfolios generally
have higher expected utilities and are more stable under big market shocks. To solve for the value
function, we derive an analytical solution in the logarithmic utility case and obtain accurate numer-
ical approximations in the general case by three methods: finite difference method, Monte Carlo
simulation, and Generative Adversarial Networks.
Keywords: robust portfolio optimization, differential games, HJBI equation, Monte Carlo, GANs
AMS subject classifications: 49N90, 49K35, 49K20, 49L20, 49L25, 91G80
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of continuous-time utility maximization. Besides the choice of utility
function, a key element in the formulation of such a problem is the a priori knowledge assumed for
the evolution of the underlying assets (e.g., the expected returns and the quadratic covariation of the
diffusion process). In a landmark paper, Merton (1969) found an explicit solution for the problem of
optimal portfolio selection and consumption, for a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
Xγ
γ , γ ∈ (0, 1) (a.k.a. power utility or isoelastic utility). He found that the optimal fraction of the wealth
to be invested in the risky asset is given by pi∗ = µ−rσ2(1−γ)
1, which is independent of both time and the
current wealth, even though this quantity is a priori allowed to evolve dynamically. This conclusion is
arguably one of the most important results in portfolio optimization (and it is also consistent with the
results of Markowitz portfolio optimization Markowitz 1952). It has led to various extensions, some of
which are illustrated in the textbook by Rogers (2013).
In the original Merton problem, the evolution of the risky asset, although stochastic by essence, is
governed by the Black-Scholes model (Black and Scholes, 1973) with fixed parameters µ, r and σ. This
is a very simplistic model for the underlying asset price. Stochastic models (for the volatility and
interest rates) that describe the price evolution more realistically have later emerged. Several papers
1Here, µ is the expected rate of asset returns, σ2 is the variance of the asset returns, r is the risk-free interest rate and
1− γ is the relative risk aversion constant.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
13
34
5v
4 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
8 M
ay
 20
20
have addressed the problem in this context: Matoussi et al. (2015) examined the case of stochastic
volatility, while Noh and Kim (2011) addressed the case of stochastic interest rates. The expected
return (or drift) µ plays an essential role in the optimal allocation; even when it is considered stochastic,
it is still assumed to be an observable input of the problem. This assumption clearly does not match the
reality that investors are facing. Several works by Lakner (1995) and then Bel Hadj Ayed et al. (2017)
addressed the utility maximization problem with an uncertain drift, although it was assumed to follow
some form of the prescribed dynamics or prior distribution.
Two decades ago, the concept of robust portfolio optimization had emerged. It was first introduced
in the operations research literature by El Ghaoui and Lebret (1997) and Ben-Tal and Nemirovski
(1998). Instead of assuming a model with a known drift, interest rate or volatility, the problem of robust
optimal allocation assumes that they will evolve dynamically in the most unfavourable way within a
given range. The resulting allocation process tends to be more stable and less vulnerable to changes and
misspecifications in model parameters.
There has been a substantial amount of literature on robust portfolio optimization over the last decade
and the area is still developing. A comprehensive introduction of the trends and methods can be found
in the book by Fabozzi et al. (2007). Gabrel et al. (2014) provided an overview of advances in robust
optimization, including but not limited to applications in finance, where they stated that “robustifying”
stochastic optimization is one of the key advancements that should develop following the 2007 financial
crisis. We list below a few pieces of influential research in this direction. For instance, Elliott and
Siu (2009) supposed that an agent wants to maximize the minimal utility function, over a family of
probability measures. This problem was then formulated as a Markovian regime-switching model, where
the market parameters are modulated by a continuous-time finite-state Markov chain that is determined
by the probability measures. Glasserman and Xu (2013) went beyond parameter uncertainties to consider
the effect of changes in the probability distributions that define an underlying model. They used relative
entropy to quantify the deviation of the worst-case model from a baseline model. Fouque et al. (2016)
studied an asset allocation problem with stochastic volatility and uncertain correlation, and derived
closed-form solutions for a class of utility functions. Ismail and Pham (2019) studied a robust Markowitz
portfolio selection problem under covariance uncertainty. The value function is obtained by optimizing
the worst-case mean-variance functional, over the admissible investing strategies α. They then solved this
problem by the McKean-Vlasov dynamic programming approach and characterized the solution with
a Bellman-Isaacs PDE. They also illustrated the robust efficient frontier in two examples: uncertain
volatilities and uncertain correlation. Last but not least, we also mention the work by Talay and Zheng
(2002), which studied the robust optimization problem in the context of derivatives hedging.
A robust investment process can be interpreted as a two-player game. On one hand, the market can
be thought of as an adversarial player controlling the volatility (or the drift) in order to minimize the
gains of an investor, on the other hand, the investor, who controls the allocation of the portfolio, is
trying to maximize her gains under the worst possible behaviour of the market. The two controllers
have conflicting interests, with the gain of one player being a loss for the other. Hence we call this
competition between the investor and the market a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game
(SDG). Differential games were first introduced by Isaacs (1965); the book by Fleming and Soner (2006)
provides a concise introduction to the theory of viscosity solutions and deterministic zero-sum differ-
ential games. The first complete theory for two-player zero-sum SDGs was developed by Fleming and
Souganidis (1989), where they proved the existence of value functions of the games. Buckdahn and Li
(2008) generalized the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) by considering the gain functional as a
solution of a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE). With the help of BSDE methods, they
proved the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) for the value functions in a more straightforward
approach. Some more recent works on zero-sum SDG include Hernández-Hernández and Sîrbu (2018),
Baltas et al. (2019) and Cosso and Pham (2019).
The main novelty of our work is threefold. Firstly, we do not assume a given range of parameters in
the evolution of the underlying process. In other papers considering uncertain volatility, the authors
assume the admissible σ ∈ [σmin, σmax], where σmin and σmax are model bounds in accordance with the
uncertainty about future fluctuations. Instead, we allow the parameters to move freely and use a penalty
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function F = F (r, µ, σ, . . .) to penalize unrealistic values of the parameters. Mathematically speaking,
the penalty function gives some coercivity to the problem so that an optimal solution can be found.
This approach has been used for robust derivatives pricing in Tan et al. (2013) and Guo et al. (2017).
Note that one can asymptotically recover the aforementioned approaches that involve a fixed parameter
range, by taking the penalty function F to be 0 over a given set and +∞ outside.
Secondly, in the classical papers studying two-player zero-sum SDGs, Fleming and Souganidis (1989) and
Nisio (2015) made the assumptions that the domain is bounded and the utility function U is bounded
and Lipschitz continuous. The present paper extends these results to more general assumptions by
considering an unbounded domain and an unbounded utility function U . Moreover, we prove that the
lower- and upper-value of the SDG (2)-(3) in fact coincide.
Last but not least, we devise two innovative algorithms to compute the value functions, which are control
randomization and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). In particular, it is, to our knowledge, the
first application of the control randomization method (see Kharroubi et al. 2014) in the context of
a robust portfolio optimization problem. It is also the first time GANs are used to solve a robust
optimization problem in the field of quantitative finance.
GANs are an exciting recent innovation in machine learning. The fundamental principle of GANs is to
use two different neural networks as two opponents with conflicting goals, and its solution is a Nash
equilibrium. Hence, GANs training is closely related to game theory. Cao et al. (2020) reviewed the
minimax structures underlying GANs, and they established theoretical connections between GANs and
Mean-Field Games. However, there are few applications of GANs in quantitative finance so far. The
only relevant work is by Wiese et al. (2020). Being inspired by GANs’ ability to generate images, they
approximated a realistic asset price simulator using adversarial training techniques.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a portfolio optimization problem
in a robust setting and introduce the uncertain drift and uncertain volatility processes. In the subsequent
sections, we only focus on the uncertain volatility case because the uncertain drift case can be solved in a
similar way. In Section 3, we define the value functions for static games and two-player zero-sum SDGs.
In Section 4 we show that the differential game has a saddle point and as a consequence, the lower- and
upper-values of the SDG coincide. We prove that the value function satisfies the DPP in Section 5 and
that our value function is the unique viscosity solution of an HJBI equation in Section 6. In section 7.1,
we derive a closed-form solution for the logarithmic utility. In section 7.2, we add some noise to the
covariance matrix and simulate portfolios with robust and non-robust strategies, respectively. Then, in
section 7.3, we test our robust mechanism by constructing two empirical portfolios using market data.
In section 7.4 and 7.6, we provide numerical results for general utility functions using PDE techniques
via finite difference methods and Monte Carlo simulations via control randomization. Finally, in section
7.6, we present the algorithm and result of solving a robust portfolio optimization problem with GANs.
2 Problem formulation
We consider a portfolio with d risky assets and one risk-free asset compounding at a constant interest
rate r ∈ R. The price process of the risky assets is denoted by St ∈ Rd (0 ≤ t ≤ T ), and the ith element
of St follows the dynamics
dSit
Sit
= µitdt+
m∑
j=1
σijt dW
j
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ d, (1)
with drift µt ∈ Rd, covariance matrix Σt ∈ Rd×d and its square-root matrix σt := Σ
1
2
t ∈ Rd×m.
We consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P), and processes µ,Σ which are progressively measurable with
respect to the P-augmented filtration of the m-dimensional Brownian motion Wt
Let Xt ∈ R be the value of the portfolio at time t. A portfolio allocation strategy αt ∈ Rd represents
the proportion of total wealth the agent invests in the d risky assets at time t, and 1 −∑di=1 αit is the
proportion invested in the risk-free asset.
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Assuming the strategy is self-financing, the wealth process evolves as follows
dXt
Xt
=
d∑
i=1
αit
dSit
Sit
+
(
1−
d∑
i=1
αit
)
rdt.
We define r := r × 1 with 1 ∈ Rd being a d-dimensional ones vector. The wealth evolution can be
rewritten as
dXt = Xt(α
ᵀ
t (µt − r) + r)dt+Xtαᵀt σtdWt. (2)
Following the setting in Fleming and Souganidis (1989) and Talay and Zheng (2002), we introduce the
canonical sample spaces for the underlying Brownian motion in (1) and (2). For each t ∈ [0, T ], we set
Ωt := (ω ∈ C([t, T ];Rm) : ωt = 0).
We denote by F = Ft,s (s ∈ [t, T ]), the filtration generated by the canonical process from time t to time
s. Equipped with the Wiener measure Pt on Ft,T , the filtered probability space (Ωt,Ft,T ,Pt,F) is the
canonical sample space.
Now, we introduce the concept of admissible controls.
Definition 1. An admissible control process Σ (resp. µ) for the market on [t, T ] is a progressively
measurable process with respect to F, taking values in a compact convex set B ⊂ Sd (resp. M ⊂ Rd),
where Sd ⊂ Rd×d is a set of symmetric positive semi-definite matrices. The set of all admissible Σ (resp.
µ) on [t, T ] is compact and convex, denoted by B (resp. M).
Definition 2. An admissible control process α for the investor on [t, T ] is a progressively measurable
process with respect to F, taking values in a compact convex set A ⊂ Rd. The set of all admissible α is
compact and convex, denoted by A.
Note that although the sets for the value of the controls are compact, in practice, A = [−R,R]d, B =
[−R,R]d×d ∩ Sd where R is arbitrarily large.
Next, let us define the payoff function as the expectation of a terminal utility function U plus a penalty
function F :
J(t, x, α, µ,Σ) = Et,x
[
U(Xα,µ,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (µs,Σs)ds
]
, (3)
where Et,x(·) = E(·|Xt = x) denotes the conditional expectation given the initial time and wealth
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R and λ0 ∈ R is a positive constant. Throughout the paper, we will often include α, µ
and Σ in the superscript ofX to indicate the dependency of the wealth process on the allocation, drift and
volatility processes. Our objective is to find the optimal portfolio allocation process α that maximizes
the worst-case payoff function given by the drift process µ or the covariance process Σ. Throughout the
paper, F will be a convex function in Σs and µs.
2.1 Robust value functions
We are now ready to define the value functions. In our problem, the covariance (or drift) is unknown.
We want to find the optimal portfolio allocation process that maximizes the worst-case situation given
by the covariance (or drift). Then, given an initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, this value is given by
u(t, x) = sup
α∈A
inf
Σ∈B,µ∈M
{
Et,x
[
U(Xα,µ,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (µs,Σs)ds
]}
.
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We say αˆ and Σˆ, µˆ are optimal controls if u(t, x) = J(t, x, αˆ, µˆ, Σˆ) = infΣ∈B,µ∈M J(t, x, αˆ, µ,Σ). Here-
after, we focus on the robust optimization problem with an uncertain covariance, that is,
u(t, x) = sup
α∈A
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
U(Xα,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]}
, (4)
because the uncertain drift case can be studied in a similar manner.
This problem is known as a static game, and the function u(t, x) is called the lower value of the static
game. If we reverse the moving order of the two players, we obtain the upper value of the static game,
which is
u¯(t, x) = inf
Σ∈B
sup
α∈A
{
Et,x
[
U(Xα,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]}
. (5)
Note that Xα,Σs ,∀s ∈ [t, T ] denotes a process controlled by processes α,Σ. When Xα,Σs starts from an
initial condition (t, x), we write the expectation of f(Xα,Σs ) as Et,x [f(Xα,Σs )].
2.2 Assumptions
In this section, we make the following assumptions which will hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. The utility function U : R→ R is a continuous, increasing and concave function such
that ∣∣∣U(x)− U(x¯)∣∣∣ ≤ Q(|x| , |x¯|) |x− x¯| , (6)
where Q(|x| , |x¯|) is a positive polynomial function.
Assumption 2. The penalty function F : B → R is a continuous convex function, and F attains its
minimum in the interior of B.
In addition to Definition 1 and 2, we need the following conditions to ensure the existence and uniqueness
of a strong solution of the SDE (2).
Assumption 3. For any Σs,s∈[t,T ] ∈ B and αs,s∈[t,T ] ∈ A, we have
E
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣F (Σs)∣∣∣ds] <∞,
and for any fixed value x0,
E
[∫ T
t
|(αᵀsµ+ r − αᵀsr)x0|2 + |αᵀsσsx0|2 ds
]
<∞.
3 Value functions of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential
games
In order to complete the description of the game, we need to clarify what information is available to
the controllers at each time s. For multi-stage discrete time games this can be formulated inductively.
However, this is problematic in continuous time, because control choices can be changed instantaneously
(Fleming and Soner, 2006, Chapter 11). To address this issue, Fleming and Souganidis (1989) adopted
the idea of a progressive strategy in a two-player zero-sum SDG, which is defined as follows:
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Definition 3. An admissible strategy Γ (resp. ∆) for the investor (resp. market) on [t, T ] is a mapping
Γ : B → A (resp. ∆ : A → B ) such that, for any s ∈ [t, T ] and Σ, Σ˜ ∈ B (resp. α, α˜ ∈ A), Σ(u) = Σ˜(u)
(resp. α(u) = α˜(u)) for all u ∈ [t, s] implies Γ(Σ)(u) = Γ(Σ˜)(u) (resp. ∆(α)(u) = ∆(α˜)(u)) for all
u ∈ [t, s]. The set of all admissible strategies for the investor (resp. market) on [t, T ] is denoted by N
(resp. M).
In the two-player zero-sum SDG, one player is allowed to strategically adapt his control according to
the control of his opponent in a non-anticipative fashion. This is in contrast to the static game, in
which the player must choose his control without any knowledge of the opponent’s choice. Then, we
may define another set of value functions using these admissible strategies: the upper value function of
the two-player zero-sum SDG is defined by
v¯(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]}
, (7)
and the corresponding lower value function is
v(t, x) = inf
∆∈M
sup
α∈A
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (∆s)ds+ U(X
α,∆
T )
]}
. (8)
The terms “lower” and “upper” are not obvious at first glance, one might first guess the opposite because
inf sup ≥ sup inf. We will justify v ≤ v¯ in Corollary 2 using the comparison principle.
4 Existence of a value for the differential games
In this section, we prove that the four value functions defined in the previous sections all coincide, i.e.,
u(t, x) = v(t, x) = v¯(t, x) = u¯(t, x). This is established via the following propositions.
Proposition 1. The four value functions defined in Section 2 and Section 3 satisfy the following in-
equalities:
u(t, x) ≤ v(t, x) ≤ v¯(t, x) ≤ u¯(t, x). (9)
Proof. The inequality v(t, x) ≤ u¯(t, x) holds becauseM contains constant mappings, i.e., ∆(α) = Σ for
any α ∈ A and fixed Σ ∈ B. Similarly, u(t, x) ≤ v¯(t, x) holds because N contains a copy of A. Then for
all α ∈ A and  > 0, there exists some ∆¯ such that
inf
∆∈M
sup
α∈A
J (t, x, α,∆(α)) +  ≥ sup
α∈A
J
(
t, x, α, ∆¯(α)
) ≥ J (t, x, α, ∆¯(α)) ≥ inf
Σ∈B
J(t, x, α,Σ).
So u(t, x) ≤ v(t, x). A similar argument gives us v¯(t, x) ≤ u¯(t, x). Hence we have
u ≤ v ≤ u¯, u ≤ v¯ ≤ u¯.
In order to complete the proof, it suffices to show that v(t, x) ≤ v¯(t, x). This is proven in Corollary
2.
Proposition 2. Let U be a continuous, increasing and concave utility function on R, suppose that
Assumption 2 holds, then u(t, x) = v(t, x) = v¯(t, x) = u¯(t, x).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Using Proposition 2, we can conclude that there exists a value for the two-player zero-sum SDG, i.e.,
v = v¯. We focus on the analysis of v¯(t, x) in the following sections.
6
5 Dynamic programming principle
If the drift and volatility functions of dynamics (2) and the utility function U were bounded and U was
Lipschitz continuous, we could apply the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) directly. However, in
our model, the drift and volatility functions are unbounded and U is only locally Lipschitz continuous.
So we must extend the classical results and use localization techniques to prove that the value function
v¯(t, x) defined in (7) satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP). The DPP is widely used in
numerical methods, such as the least squares Monte Carlo method.
Before presenting the main result, we require the following important property of the value function.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold true. Then the value function v¯(t, x) (7) is
locally Lipchitz continuous w.r.t x. There exists a positive polynomial function Φ such that∣∣∣v¯(t, x)− v¯(t, x¯)∣∣∣ ≤ Φ(|x| , |x¯|) |x− x¯| , ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. (10)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
We are now in the position to present a main result in this paper.
Theorem 1 (Dynamic Programming Principle). Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Define
the value function v¯(t, x) by (7) for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. Then, for t ≤ t+ θ ≤ T , we have
v¯(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ t+θ
t
F (Σs)ds+ v¯(t+ θ,X
Γ,Σ
t+θ)
]}
. (11)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
As a consequence of the DPP, the value function v¯(t, x) satisfies the following property.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Then the value function v¯(t, x) defined
in (7) is Hölder continuous in t on [0, T ].
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
6 Viscosity solution of the HJBI equation
In this section, we prove that the value function is the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman-Isaacs equation. In 6.1, we prove the existence of the viscosity solution, and we state the
uniqueness of this viscosity solution in 6.2.
6.1 Existence of a viscosity solution of the HJBI Equation
Now we state another main result in this paper; the proof is a modification of Talay and Zheng (2002).
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Then the value function v¯(t, x) defined
in (7) is a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation
{
∂v
∂t (t, x) +H(t, x,
∂v
∂x (t, x),
∂2v
∂x2 (t, x)) = 0 in [0, T )× R
v(T, x) = U(x) on [T ]× R, (12)
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where
H(t, x, p,M) = inf
Σ∈B
sup
a∈A
{
λ0F (Σ) + (a
ᵀ(µ− r) + r)xp+ 1
2
tr
(
aᵀΣax2M
)}
, (13)
for (t, x, p,M) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R× R.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
6.2 Comparison principle for the HJBI Equation
In this subsection, we present the comparison principle for equation (12), which implies the uniqueness
of the viscosity solution of the HJBI equation. We can adapt the proof from Pham (2009, Theorem
4.4.4) for an HJB equation and straightforwardly extend it to HJBI equations with two controls.
Theorem 3. Comparison Principle (Pham 2009, Theorem 4.4.4).
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Define the HJBI equation as
− ∂v
∂t
(t, x)− inf
Σ∈B
sup
a∈A
{
λ0F (Σ) + (a
ᵀ(µ− r) + r)x∂v
∂x
(t, x) +
1
2
tr
(
aᵀΣax2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x)
)}
= 0,
for (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R. (14)
Let U (resp. V ) be a u.s.c. viscosity subsolution (resp. l.s.c. supersolution) with polynomial growth
condition to equation (14). If U(T, ·) ≤ V (T, ·) on R, then U ≤ V on [0, T ]× R.
As a consequence of the comparison principle, the function v¯(t, x) (7) is in fact the unique viscosity
solution of the HJBI equation (12).
Corollary 2. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Define the lower and upper value functions of the
two-player zero-sum SDG by (8) and (7). Then
v(t, x) ≤ v¯(t, x) for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Proof. From Theorem 2, v¯(t, x) is a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation (12). Let φ ∈ C∞([0, T )×R)
be a test function such that (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ) × R is a local minimum of v¯ − φ. Using the viscosity
supersolution property of v¯(t, x), we have
−∂φ
∂t
(t0, x0)−H(t0, x0, ∂φ
∂x
(t0, x0),
∂2φ
∂x2
(t0, x0)) ≥ 0,
where H(t, x, p,M) is defined by (13). Define
H˜(t, x, p,M) = sup
a∈A
inf
Σ∈B
{
λ0F (Σ) + (a
ᵀ(µ− r) + r)xp+ 1
2
tr
(
aᵀΣax2M
)}
. (15)
It is obvious that H ≥ H˜, so
−∂φ
∂t
(t0, x0)− H˜(t0, x0, ∂φ
∂x
(t0, x0),
∂2φ
∂x2
(t0, x0)) ≥ 0 in [0, T )× R.
Thus v¯(t, x) is a supersolution of the HJBI equation
∂v
∂t
(t, x) + H˜(t, x,
∂v
∂x
(t, x),
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R.
Using the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) and a similar argument, we can prove the lower
value function v(t, x) (8) is the unique viscosity solution of the HJBI equation{
∂v
∂t (t, x) + H˜(t, x,
∂v
∂x (t, x),
∂2v
∂x2 (t, x)) = 0 in [0, T )× R
v(T, x) = U(x) on [T ]× R. (16)
Finally, by the comparison principle, we have v(t, x) ≤ v¯(t, x), as required.
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7 Numerical results
In this section, we provide a few numerical examples with commonly used utility functions. We first
establish an analytical solution in the case of the Logarithmic utility function. Then we numerically
approximate the value functions for both the Logarithmic and CRRA utility functions using an implicit
finite difference method, a control randomization method, and a Generative Adversarial Network method.
7.1 Analytical solution
In the first example, we consider U(x) = ln(x) and the penalty function F (σ2t ) = (σt−σ0)2. It is possible
to find the explicit solution for the value function as well as the optimal controls. Writing XT explicitly,
the value function becomes:
v¯(t, x) = sup
α∈A
inf
σ2∈B
{
Et,x
[
ln(x) +
∫ T
t
(αsµ+ (1− αs)r − 1
2
α2sσ
2
s)ds+
∫ T
t
αsσsdWs + λ0
∫ T
t
(σs − σ0)2ds
]}
= sup
α∈A
inf
σ2∈B
{
Et,x
[
ln(x) +
∫ T
t
αsµ+ (1− αs)r − 1
2
α2sσ
2
s + λ0(σs − σ0)2ds
]}
.
(17)
To find the optimal αs and σ2s , we can differentiate instantaneously the integrand αs(µ−r)+r− 12α2sσ2s+
λ0(σs−σ0)2 with respect to αs and σ2s respectively. Then we obtain the following optimality conditions:
αˆs =
µ− r
σˆ2s
, (18)
−1
2
αˆ2s + λ0(1−
σ0
σˆs
) = 0, (19)
which leads to a quartic equation
0 = σˆ4s − σ0σˆ3s −
(µ− r)2
2λ0
. (20)
The optimal σˆs and αˆs can be solved from equation (20) explicitly; we provide the solution in A.6.
The equation (20) always has a real positive root, hence the optimal volatility σˆs ∈ B and optimal
strategy αˆs ∈ A. By substituting the optimal controls into (17), we obtain the analytical solution of
the value function. From equations (18)–(19), we observe that the optimal volatility and investment
strategy are both constants, being independent of the wealth Xs and the time s. The classical optimal
portfolio strategy given by Merton is also a constant, where α∗ = µ−rσ2(1−γ) for CRRA utility functions.
However, in our problem, it is not possible to find an analytical solution for a power utility function. We
will use numerical methods to estimate the values in the next subsection. It is worth mentioning that,
when U(x) = ln(x), we can apply the above method to portfolios with multiple risky assets and get the
analytical solutions by solving a system of optimality conditions. The detailed process is very similar,
hence omitted here. Moreover, the reference volatility σ0 is not necessarily a constant, it can be a local
volatility depending on time and stock price.
7.2 Comparison of robust and non-robust portfolios with Monte Carlo sim-
ulation
In this section, we implement our robust strategy using Monte Carlo simulations, and compare the
performance of robust and non-robust portfolios.
As we know, in the real world volatility estimates are noisy and biased, though likely to bounce around a
reference value in the long run. In the first experiment, we have a reference covariance matrix Σ0, which
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is estimated according to historical data. We assume that the real-world covariance is the reference
covariance Σ0 plus some noise. We construct robust and non-robust portfolios consisting of two risky
assets and one risk-free asset. For the robust portfolio, we use F (Σs) = λ0
∥∥Σs − Σ0∥∥22 as the penalty
function, then the analytical robust investment strategy (αˆ1s, αˆ2s) can be calculated in a similar method
to the one in section 7.1. For the non-robust one, we use Σ0 as the covariance, then calculate the
non-robust strategy (α1s, α2s) accordingly. Assuming the real covariance matrix during the investment
process is Σreal = Σ0 + ε× noise, where the noise follows a standard normal distribution N (0, 1) and ε
is the magnitude of the noise, we use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the expected utility function
E
[
ln(XT )
]
= Et,x
[
ln(x) +
∫ T
t
αᵀs (µ− r) + r −
1
2
αᵀsΣrealαsds
]
. (21)
We substitute αs = (αˆ1s, αˆ2s) in (21) for the robust portfolio, and αs = (α1s, α2s) for the non-robust one.
The results with various λ0 are shown in Figures 1 to 3, where we used 2× 105 paths in the simulation
and the initial wealth X0 = 1. We can observe that the robust portfolio may underperform when there
is little noise. But, as the noise size ε increases, the robust strategy will outperform the non-robust
strategy eventually. Comparing Figures 1, 2 and 3, we can find that when the penalty is relatively weak
(λ0 = 0.01), it takes a bigger noise size for the robust strategy to outperform. When the penalty is
stiff (λ0 = 70), the robust strategy will outperform with a very small noise size. The robust expected
utility is almost a constant for all sizes of noise in Figure 1, meaning that our model is very robust to
changes in market circumstances. Among the three values of λ0 illustrated, Figure 3 is probably the
most attractive to investors. When the reference Σ0 is perfect, the robust portfolio only loses to the
non-robust one by a little, but when Σ0 is wrong, the robust portfolio outperforms the non-robust one
by a large amount. It means the price we pay for the robustness is tolerable, but the potential reward
is substantial.
Define the crossing point ε as the value of ε for which the robust expected utility matches the non-robust
expected utility. Figure 4 depicts how the crossing point ε varies with respect to λ0. It tells us how
much should our reference covariance be wrong for the robust portfolio to outperform the non-robust
portfolio. The behaviour of the robust portfolio varies with λ0. For a certain ε, by looping over a range
of λ0, we can find the one giving us the maximal robust expected utility. This relation is plotted in
Figure 5. With this plot, if we know how confident we are with the reference Σ0 (i.e., the value of ε),
we can choose the best λ0 for robust portfolio allocation.
7.3 Comparison of robust and non-robust portfolios with empirical market
data
In the second experiment, we implement the robust and non-robust strategies with empirical market
data. We have 1007 portfolios, and we construct each portfolio according to robust and non-robust
allocations, respectively. Each portfolio consists of 2 risky assets and 1 risk-free asset, with a maturity
of T = 1 year. The portfolios’ starting dates range from 02/04/15 to 03/04/19 (for example, the 1st
portfolio starts on 02/04/15 and lasts for one year, the 1007th portfolio starts on 03/04/19 and lasts for
one year as well). We choose the S&P500 (∧GSPC) and SPDR Gold Shares (GLD)2 as our risky assets
and use a constant interest rate r = 0.015. For a specific portfolio, we estimate the parameter Σ0 using
the standard deviation and correlation of 5 years’ daily relative returns before the starting date. The
estimated annual expected returns µ1, µ2 are the exponentially weighted moving average of the previous
5 years’ daily relative returns, where the weighted constant is 0.999.
In this experiment, we use a logarithmic utility function and a penalty function F (Σs) = λ0
∥∥Σs−Σ0∥∥22.
At the beginning of the investment process for each portfolio, we estimate parameters µ1, µ2,Σ0 and then
2Stock prices are downloaded from Yahoo Finance.
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Figure 1: Expected utility with λ0 = 0.01 Figure 2: Expected utility with λ0 = 1
Figure 3: Expected utility with λ0 = 70
Figure 4 Figure 5
compute the robust and non-robust portfolio allocations accordingly. Starting from an initial wealth
X0 = 1, the wealth of the non-robust portfolio evolves as
Xn+1 = Xn exp
{
α1n
S1n+1 − S1n
S1n
+ α2n
S2n+1 − S2n
S2n
+ (1− α1n − α2n)r∆t
− 1
2
[
α1n
(
S1n+1 − S1n
S1n
− µ1∆t
)
+ α2n
(
S2n+1 − S2n
S2n
− µ2∆t
)]2}
, n ∈ [0, 251], (22)
where (α1n, α2n) are the non-robust allocations on day n. For the wealth of the robust portfolio, just
replace (α1n, α2n) with the robust allocations (αˆ1n, αˆ2n) in (22). Finally, by averaging the ln(XT ) of all the
portfolios, we get the expected utility function.
Figures 6–9 present the terminal wealth XT of the 1007 robust and non-robust portfolios. While λ0 is
small, the robust portfolios behave very stably. No matter how the market changes, the robust terminal
wealth stays around 1. As λ0 increases, the robust portfolios start to show fluctuations. Eventually,
their behaviour converges to that of the non-robust portfolios as λ0 approaches to infinity. This trend
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is consistent with our expectation. The penalty function is not playing its role when λ0 is close to zero.
Hence the robust allocations are optimal for the most chaotic market situations, and the investment
strategies are very conservative. As λ0 becomes larger, the penalty function comes into play and prevents
extreme volatilities. As a consequence, the robust strategies are less conservative, and portfolios will
show some fluctuations under price shocks.
We show the robust and non-robust expected utilities in Figure 10. It depicts how E[ln(Xα
1,α2
T )] and
E[ln(X αˆ
1,αˆ2
T )] change w.r.t. λ0. We can compare this plot with Figures 1, 2, 3 and 5 in section 7.2. For
a given amount of noise, the robust portfolio may underperform for small λ0, but the value will increase
gradually and reach a highest point. Finally, the robust expected utility will converge to the non-robust
one.
Figure 6: Terminal wealth with λ0 = 0.01 Figure 7: Terminal wealth with λ0 = 10
Figure 8: Terminal wealth with λ0 = 100 Figure 9: Terminal wealth with λ0 = 1000
Figure 10: Empirical expected utility w.r.t. λ0
To illustrate the time evolution of the portfolio wealth, we show the stock prices and wealth of two
portfolios, starting on 2017-01-03 (Figure 11) and 2018-01-26 (Figure 12), respectively. For the portfolio
in Figure 11, the optimal non-robust allocations are α1 = 5.778, α2 = −2.174, and the robust allocations
with λ0 = 200 are αˆ1 = 3.083, αˆ2 = −1.452. The allocations are both constant, independent of time.
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The S&P500 keeps rising in Figure 11a, while there are some fluctuations in the Gold price. Over the
same period, the absolute performance of the non-robust portfolio is better all the way (Figure 11b).
For the portfolio in Figure 12, we have α1 = 9.418, α2 = 0.301, and αˆ1 = 3.940, αˆ2 = −0.054. Since the
proportions invested in Gold are small for both robust and non-robust portfolios, the trend of wealth is
dominated by the price of S&P500. There are two big drops happening in Feb. 2018 and Dec. 2018,
respectively. These are also reflected in the portfolio wealth in Figure 12b. However, compared with
the non-robust strategy, the robust strategy is more conservative. Hence, the robust portfolio loses less
during the market shocks and outperforms the non-robust one.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: The portfolio starting on 2017-01-03
(a) (b)
Figure 12: The portfolio starting on 2018-01-26
From the above empirical experiments and the Monte Carlo simulations from subsection 7.2 , we can see
that, by adding this robust mechanism with a properly chosen λ0, the portfolio value can overcome a
wrong covariance matrix estimate and is less vulnerable to sudden market shocks. Furthermore, unlike
other robust methods which only consider the worst case, our model is more flexible and provides a
greater range of more practical in-between option.
7.4 Implicit finite difference method
In this section, we are computing the value function via an implicit finite difference method. With the
penalty function F (σ2t ) = λ0(σ2t )2, the HJBI equation is
v¯t +H(t, x, v¯x, v¯xx) = 0, (23)
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where the Hamiltonian is defined by
H(t, x, v¯x, v¯xx) = inf
σ2
sup
a
{
a(µ− r)xv¯x + rxv¯x + 1
2
a2σ2x2v¯xx + λ0(σ
2)2
}
. (24)
Solving for the optimal controls in (24) using the first order condition, we obtain aˆ = − (µ−r)xv¯xσ2x2v¯xx and
σˆ2 =
(
− (µ−r)2v¯2x4λ0v¯xx
)1/3
. Substituting aˆ and σˆ2 into the PDE (23), we obtain
v¯t + Cv¯
4
3
x (−v¯xx)− 23 + rxv¯x = 0,
where C = (3× 2− 43 )λ 130 (µ− r)
4
3 . Note we have shown in Section 4 that v¯xx < 0.
Since the PDE (23) is non-linear, in order to use the implicit finite difference method, we first linearize
the function H with respect to the second order term via the Legendre transform. This method was
also used by Jonsson and Sircar (2002a,b) to solve nonlinear HJB equations. We also combine the
linearization step with a fixed-point iteration scheme.
Define H∗ as the Legendre transform of H with respect to the second order term; it is given by
H∗(a) = −C2a 25 v¯
4
5
x − rxv¯x,
where C2 = 53 (
2
3 )
− 25C
3
5 . Hence, we can represent H(v¯xx) as the supremum of linear functions of v¯xx,
H(v¯xx) = sup
a
{
a · v¯xx −H∗(a)
}
. (25)
It is difficult to check the condition for stability in our PDE as the optimal a is unknown. Fortunately,
implicit finite difference methods have a weaker requirement for stability than explicit finite difference
methods.
We set the time grid as 0, 1, ..., n, n + 1, ..., N , and the spatial grid as 1, 2, ...i, i + 1, ...M . With the
maturity T = 1, we use a constant time step ∆t = TN and a constant spatial step ∆x. We apply a
forward approximation for v¯t, a central approximation for v¯x, and a standard approximation for v¯xx.
Working backward in the implicit scheme, at each time step n, the optimal aˆ in (25) is the solution of
the first order condition v¯nxx + C2(v¯nx )
4
5
2
5 aˆ
− 35 = 0, or equivalently,
aˆ =
2
3
C(v¯nx )
4
3 (−v¯nxx)−
5
3 =: f(aˆ). (26)
Although we do not have the true values for v¯n as the values of v¯n depend on aˆ, we can use a fixed-point
iteration scheme to find the solution of equation (26). First we make an initial guess aˆ0 using the known
values v¯n+1, then iteratively generate a sequence aˆk,k=1,2,... with aˆk = f(aˆk−1) until aˆk converges.
Finally we can substitute the discrete approximations of the derivatives into the HJBI equation (23),
and we obtain the implicit form:(
aˆ(i)∆t
∆x2
− r (i∆x+ x0) ∆t
2∆x
)
v¯ni−1 +
(
−1− 2aˆ(i)∆t
∆x2
)
v¯ni +
(
aˆ(i)∆t
∆x2
+
r (i∆x+ x0) ∆t
2∆x
)
v¯ni+1
= −v¯n+1i − C2aˆ(i)
2
5
( v¯n+1i+1 − v¯n+1i−1
2∆x
) 4
5
∆t. (27)
Let B be the coefficient matrix, Kn the value vector at time n and Fn+1 the right hand side of (27).
Then equation (27) can be written in a matrix notation:
BKn +Gn = Fn+1, n = N − 1, ..., 1, 0.
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Figure 13: U(XT ) = ln(XT ), St ∈ R1 Figure 14: U(XT ) = ln(XT ), St ∈ R2
The algorithm for this method is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Implicit Finite Difference Scheme
for step n = N : 1 do
1. Solve BKn−1 +Gn−1 = Fn using aˆ0(i) = g(v¯ni+1, v¯ni , v¯ni−1), and get the value vector K
n−1
0
2. Solve BKn−1 +Gn−1 = Fn using aˆ1(i) = g(v¯n−1i+1 , v¯
n−1
i , v¯
n−1
i−1 ), where the values v¯
n−1 are from Kn−10 .
Then get the value vector Kn−11 .
3. Repeat step 2 until
∥∥aˆj − aˆj−1∥∥2 ≤ tolerance
4. Let Kn−1 = Kn−1j
end
7.4.1 Logarithmic utility function
In the 1-asset example, we use the logarithmic utility function and the penalty function F (σ2t ) = λ0(σ2t )2.
The terminal condition is given by the utility function,
v¯(tN , xi) = U(xi) ∀i ∈ [1,M ].
The boundary conditions v¯(tn, x1) and v¯(tn, xM ) for n ∈ [0, N − 1] are given explicitly by the equation
v¯(tn, x) = ln(x) + sup
α
inf
σ2
{N−1∑
s=n
(
αs(µ− r) + r − 1
2
α2sσ
2
s + λ0(σ
2
s)
2
)
∆t
}
,
with
αˆs =
µ− r
σ2s
, σˆ2s =
α2
4λ0
.
Similarly, we can also implement the above method on a 2-asset example where St ∈ R2 and F (Σt) =
λ0 ‖Σt‖22. The HJBI equation becomes
v¯t + inf
σ1,σ2,ρ
sup
α1,α2
{
(α1(µ1 − r) + α2(µ2 − r) + r)xv¯x + 1
2
(α21σ
2
1 + 2α1α2σ1σ2ρ+ α
2
2σ
2
2)x
2v¯xx
+ λ0(σ
4
1 + 2σ
2
1σ
2
2ρ
2 + σ42)
}
= 0. (28)
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(a) estimated value function (b) estimated aˆ in each iteration
Figure 15: Finite Difference Method for U(XT ) = 43X
1
4
T
We can solve for the optimal controls αˆ1, αˆ2, σˆ1, σˆ2, ρˆ in (28) using the first order condition. In this
example, we always have the optimal σˆ1, σˆ2 > 0 and ρˆ ∈ [−1, 1]. Then, by applying Algorithm 1, we
can get the value function of a portfolio with 2 risky assets.
Figure 13 shows the PDE estimated v¯(t, x) for the 1-asset example with parameters r = 0.015, µ =
0.035, λ0 = 10; Figure 14 shows result for the 2-asset case with parameters r = 0.015, µ1 = 0.035, µ2 =
0.045, λ0 = 10. Comparing with the analytical solution, we can see that the two curves completely
overlap for both 1-asset and 2-asset cases, which validates the accuracy of the PDE approach.
7.4.2 Power utility function
In the second example, we use a power utility function. This time, we only have the terminal condition
and the boundary condition for x1 = 0, but not the boundary condition for a large xM . For functions
xγ where γ < 1, γ 6= 0, the limit of the first order derivative approaches 0 as x goes to infinity. Therefore
we can use a zero Neumann boundary condition when xM is large. Then we have the following terminal
and boundary conditions:
v¯(tN , xi) = U(xi)∀i ∈ [1,M ], v¯(tn, x1) = 0∀x1 = 0, n ∈ [0, N − 1], ∂v¯
∂x
(tn, xM ) = 0∀n ∈ [0, N − 1].
Figure 15a shows the simulated value v¯(t, x) for a range of x, with U(XT ) = 43X
1
4
T and parameters
µ = 0.035, r = 0.015, λ0 = 10. We only display the estimated curve computed by our PDE method,
as there is no analytical solution available for comparison in this example. Figure 15b shows the first
four iterations of the estimated aˆ from an initial guess. There is almost no difference between the four
curves, indicating that the fixed point iteration scheme has converged within the first four iterations.
This subsection has shown that the PDE method converges to the true value efficiently. Nevertheless,
there are a few shortcomings to this approach:
• The PDE approach requires tedious algebraic manipulation before implementation. In particular, even
when using the same utility function, the preliminary computations have to be redone if we switch to
a different penalty function.
• In general, PDE approaches suffer from the curse of dimensionality. As the dimension of the problem
becomes higher, the computational complexity increases exponentially and the approach becomes
infeasible. Although the PDE approach suffices for our current problem as the wealth process is only
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one-dimensional, it may not be feasible for other problems arising from multidimensional stochastic
differential games.
For these two reasons, in the next subsection we develop a numerical scheme based on Monte Carlo
simulations, which can be potentially useful for high-dimensional problems or in the case of complex
penalty functions.
7.5 Monte Carlo method
In this section, we implement a Regression Monte Carlo scheme to solve the same robust portfolio
allocation problems. Carriere (1996) introduced the Regression Monte Carlo approach to solve optimal
stopping problems for any Markovian process in discrete time. In particular, he used non-parametric
regression techniques. Later, Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (2001) and Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) used
a similar scheme with ordinary least squares (a.k.a. Least Squares Monte Carlo) to value American
options, respectively by value iteration and by performance iteration (see for example Denault and
Simonato 2017). Since then, Regression Monte Carlo has become a popular tool in option pricing and
more generally for solving discrete-time stochastic control problems in finite horizon.
First of all, we discretize the time interval [0, T ] into N time steps with a constant step size ∆t = TN .
Using the Euler scheme on the logarithm of the state variable, one obtains the following dynamics for
the discrete-time wealth Xn:
X0 = x
Xn+1 = Xn exp
([
(αᵀn(µ− r) + r −
1
2
αᵀnΣnαn
]
∆t+ αᵀn(Σn)
1
2 ∆Wn
)
, n ∈ [0, N − 1] (29)
and the discretized form of our value is
v¯(0, X0) = sup
α∈A
inf
Σ∈B
{
E
[
λ0
N−1∑
n=0
F (Σn)∆t+ U(XN )
∣∣X0 = x]} . (30)
As we have proved in Section 5, this value function satisfies the DPP:
v¯(N,XN ) = U(XN )
v¯(n,Xn) = sup
α∈A
inf
Σ∈B
{
λ0F (Σn)∆t+ E
[
v¯(n+ 1, Xn+1)
∣∣Fn]} , n ∈ [0, N − 1] . (31)
7.5.1 Control randomization
Inspired by the Dynamic Programming Principle, we can start from the known terminal condition
and compute the value functions backward in time recursively. Equation (31) involves a conditional
expectation, which cannot be computed explicitly. Instead, one can for example use a least squares
regression to approximate E
[
v¯(n+ 1, Xn+1)
∣∣Fn] with a polynomial basis function. The obstacle in the
implementation is that we are not able to simulate the paths Xn forward, since the dynamics of the
state variable depends on the uncertain controls. Following Kharroubi et al. (2014), one way to tackle
this problem is an initial randomization of the controls, i.e., we choose an arbitrary initial distribution
for the controls and simulate the Xn with these dummy αn and Σn , before including these dummy
controls in the regressors of the least-squares regressions.
Proofs of the convergence and error bounds for standard Regression Monte Carlo are available in Clé-
ment et al. (2002) and Beutner et al. (2013) for example. In the case of controlled dynamics, Kharroubi
et al. (2015) analyzed the time-discretization error, and Kharroubi et al. (2014) investigated the pro-
jection error generated by approximating the conditional expectation by basis functions for the control
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randomization scheme. Recently, alternative randomization schemes have been proposed in the litera-
ture, such as Ludkovski and Maheshwari (2019), Balata and Palczewski (2018), Bachouch et al. (2018)
or Shen and Weng (2019), which are more amenable to comprehensive convergence proofs, see Balata
and Palczewski (2017) and Huré et al. (2018). Nevertheless, the classical control randomization scheme
retains some advantages, such as the ease with which it can handle switching costs, as shown in Zhang
et al. (2019).
For the choice of basis function φ, we can use a polynomial function in Xn, αn,Σn, and let φ =∑K
k=0 βkφk. Once we complete the regression, we can approximate the conditional expected value
function E
[
v¯(n + 1, Xn+1)
∣∣Fn] in (31) by φ(βˆ;Xn, αn,Σn). For the mth simulation path, we can find
the optimal controls by:
Σˆmn = arg min
Σmn
{
λ0F (Σ
m
n )∆t+ φ(βˆ;X
m
n , α
m
n ,Σ
m
n )
}
,
αˆmn = arg max
αmn
{
λ0F (Σˆ
m
n )∆t+ φ(βˆ;X
m
n , α
m
n , Σˆ
m
n (α
m
n ))
}
.
The complete process is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Control Randomization
Backward Regression:
1. Choose an initial distribution and generate initial random controls accordingly.
2. Generate M paths of state variable Xn. The mth path starts from the initial condition Xm0 = x,
evolves following the dynamics with {αmn ,Σmn }N−1n=0 and assign v¯(N,XmN ) = U(XmN ).
3. For n = N − 1 : 0 do
(a) Regress
{
v¯(n+1, Xmn+1)
}M
m=1
on
{
Xmn , α
m
n ,Σ
m
n
}M
m=1
, and get the regression coefficients
{
βˆkn+1
}
k
(b) Find the optimal controls αˆmn , Σˆmn by arg maxα minΣ
{
λ0F (Σ
m
n )∆t+
∑K
k=0 βˆ
k
n+1φk(X
m
n,α
m
n ,Σ
m
n )
}
(c) The value function at time step n is v¯(n,Xmn ) = λ0F (Σˆmn )∆t+
∑K
k=0 βˆ
k
n+1φk(X
m
n, αˆ
m
n , Σˆ
m
n )
4. The value function v¯(0, x) = 1M
∑M
m=1 v¯(0, X
m
0 )
Forward Resimulation:
1. Set the initial condition X˜m0 = x
2. For n = 0 : N − 1
(a) Find the optimal controls α˜mn , Σ˜mn by arg maxα minΣ
{
λ0F (Σn)∆t+
∑K
k=0 βˆ
k
n+1φk(X˜
m
n,αn,Σn)
}
,
using the regression coefficients obtained in the backward part and the new state variable X˜mn .
(b) The state variable at time step n+1 is X˜mn+1 = X˜mn exp
{[
(α˜mn )
ᵀ(µ−r)+r− 1
2
(α˜mn )
ᵀΣ˜mn α˜
m
n
]
∆t+
(α˜mn )
ᵀ(Σ˜mn )
1
2 ∆Wn
}
3. The forward simulated value function v¯f (0, x) = 1M
∑M
m=1
[
λ0
∑N−1
n=0 F (Σ˜
m
n )∆t+ U(X˜
m
N )
]
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7.5.2 Logarithmic utility function
We first consider an example with 1 risky asset. When the utility function is logarithmic and the penalty
function is F (σ2t ) = λ0(σ2t )2, we choose the following basis function
K∑
k=0
βkn+1φk(Xn,αn, σn) = β0 + β1 ln(Xn) + β2αn + β3αnσn + β4σ
2
nα
2
n.
To find the optimal controls, we differentiate λ0F (σ2n)∆t+
∑K
k=0 β
k
n+1φk(Xn,αn, σn) with respect to αn
and σ2n, then we can get the optimal controls by solving the following polynomial equation
4λ0dtσˆ
6
n +
β2β3
2β4
σˆn +
β22
2β4
= 0.
With β4 < 0, there exists a real positive root. We can see the optimal controls are constants for each
step, being independent of the state variable Xn, this is the same as our observation in the analytical
solution.
We used M = 5 × 106 paths, T = 1 and step size ∆t = 150 in the simulation, with the parameters
x0 = 5, r = 0.015, λ0 = 10. Figure 16 shows the backward regression values, forward resimulation values
and true values as we change the parameter µ. Figure 17 compares the forward resimulation values,
finite difference results and true values as we change the parameter µ. It shows that both the PDE and
Monte Carlo approach the true value in this example.
Figure 16: U(XT ) = ln(XT ), St ∈ R1 Figure 17: U(XT ) = ln(XT ), St ∈ R1
Figure 18: U(XT ) = ln(XT ), St ∈ R2, x0 = 5,
r = 0.015, µ1 = 0.035, µ2 = 0.045
Figure 19: U(XT ) = 43X
1
4
T
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For the example with 2 risky assets, we use the logarithmic utility function and the penalty function
F (Σt) = λ0 ‖Σt‖22. We choose the following basis function in this case:
K∑
k=0
βkn+1φk(Xn, α
1
n, α
2
n, σ
1
n, σ
2
n, ρn) = β0 + β1 ln(Xn) + β2α
1
n + β3α
2
n + β4(α
1
n)
2(σ1n)
2 + β5(α
2
n)
2(σ2n)
2
+ β6α
1
nα
2
nσ
1
nσ
2
nρn + β7(σ
1
n)
4 + β8(σ
2
n)
4 + β9(σ
1
n)
2(σ2n)
2ρ2n,
where σ1n, σ2n are the volatilities of the two assets and ρn is the correlation between the assets. We can
differentiate λ0 ‖Σt‖22 ∆t+
∑K
k=0 β
k
n+1φk(Xn, α
1
n, α
2
n, σ
1
n, σ
2
n, ρn) to get the optimal controls. In practice,
we always have σˆ1n, σˆ2n > 0, but we need to truncate ρˆn to [−1, 1]. The optimal controls are also constants
for each step as in the 1-asset case.
In the implementation, we use M = 4 × 106 paths, T = 1 and step size ∆t = 150 . The result is
provided in Figure 18. This plot compares the backward regression values, forward resimulation values
and the analytical values, and it shows how the values change w.r.t. the penalty strength λ0. From our
observation, the average of the forward and backward results yields an even better estimate.
We can observe from Figure 16 and 18 that, as claimed in Kharroubi et al. (2014), the value function
estimated at the end of the backward loop serves as an upper bound for the true value, while the one
obtained from the forward resimulation serves as a lower bound and has a smaller error than the upper
bound.
7.5.3 Power utility function
Here we show a 1-asset example with power utility. When the utility function is U(XT ) = 43X
1
4
T and the
penalty function F (σ2t ) = λ0(σ2t )2, we choose the basis function
φ = β0 + β1X
1
4
n + β2X
1
4
n αn + β3X
1
4
n αnσn + β4X
1
4
n α
2
nσ
2
n. (32)
To find the optimal controls, we differentiate λ0F (σ2n)∆t +
∑K
k=0 β
k
n+1φk(Xn,αn, σn) and then get the
polynomial equation (33) for each path. We can see the optimal controls αˆn and σˆn depend on Xn in
this case.
β22X
1
4
n + β2β3X
1
4
n σn + 8β4λ0dtσ
6
n = 0 (33)
Figure (19) shows Monte Carlo and finite difference approximations for a range of drifts µ, with x0 =
5, , r = 0.015, λ0 = 10, M = 5× 106, N = 65. We can see that the PDE estimates lie within the Monte
Carlo bounds and that the forward simulation values almost overlap the PDE estimations. Although
we do not have the analytical solution for this power utility case, these plots suggest that we are able
to estimate the true values accurately with both Control Randomization and Finite Difference.
In both the logarithmic and power utility cases, the forward resimulation always performs better than
the backward loop estimates. That is because the forward resimulation only suffers from one source of
error, the optimal control estimation, while the backward regression suffers more directly from regression
error (see Kharroubi et al. 2014). So the forward simulation result is a better estimator of the true value
and is the one we use for comparison with the analytical and PDE approaches.
From the results above, we can see that for these robust portfolio allocation problems with one single
risky asset, both PDE and Monte Carlo methods provide accurate estimates, with the PDE estimates
being slightly better overall. Both methods can be considered for solving robust portfolio allocation
problems in practice. Some difficulties with the Monte Carlo approach are the choice of the basis and
the number of Monte Carlo paths needed for a stable convergence. Still, the Monte Carlo would be the
method of choice for more realistic portfolio allocation with multiple risky assets (see Zhang et al. 2019),
as the PDE approach could quickly become computationally intractable in this situation.
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7.6 Generative Adversarial Networks
In this section, we devise a GAN-based algorithm to solve the two-player zero-sum differential game.
Generative Adversarial Networks were introduced in Goodfellow et al. (2014). A GAN is a combination
of two competing (deep) neural networks: a generator and a discriminator. The generator network tries
to generate data that looks similar to the training data, and the discriminator network tries to tell the
real data from the fake data. The idea behind GANs is very similar to the robust optimization problem
studied in our paper: GANs can be interpreted are minimax games between the generator and the
discriminator, whereas our problem is a minimax game between the agent who controls the portfolio
allocation and the market who controls the covariance matrix. Inspired by this connection, we propose
the following GAN-based algorithm.
Our GANs are composed of two neural networks; one generates α (α-generator), the other generates σ
(σ-generator). The two networks have conflicting goals, the α-generator tries to maximize the expected
utility, while the σ-generator wants to minimize the expected utility. They compete against each other
during the training. Because we have two networks with different objectives, it cannot be trained as a
regular neural network. Each training iteration is divided into two phases: In the first phase, we train
the α-generator, with the loss function L1 = −E
[
U(XT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (σ2s)ds
]
. Then the back-propagation
only optimizes the weights of the α-generator. In the second phase, given the output α from the α-
generator, we train the σ-generator with a loss function L2 = E
[
U(XT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (σ2s)ds
]
. During this
phase, the weights of the α-generator are frozen and the back-propagation only updates the weights of
the σ-generator. In a zero-sum game, the α-generator and σ-generator constantly try to outsmart each
other. As training advances, the game may end up at a Nash Equilibrium.
A demonstration of the simplified network architecture is illustrated in Figure 20. The blue part on the
left of Figure 20 is the α-generator. For each time step n, we construct a network (An), with the input
Xn and parameter σn, the network generates output αn. With the dynamics of wealth (29), we can
continue this process until we get the terminal wealth XN . Once we get the output {αn}n∈[1,N ], we can
use them as parameters for the σ-generator (the green part in the figure). In the σ-generator, similarly,
we have one network (Sn) for each time step n. With the input Xn and parameter αn, we can generate
σn. At the end of this phrase, the sequence {σn}n∈[1,N ] will be fed into the α-generator as parameters
as well. We have summarized this training process for 1-asset examples in Algorithm 3.
In the implementation, we choose the parameters T = 1, r = 0.015, µ = 0.035. The portfolio has
an initial wealth x0 = 5, and the training data has a sample size M = 200, 000. We discretize the
investment process into N = 65 time steps. The deep neural network for each time step contains
4 hidden layers, using Leaky ReLU as the activation function. For the σ generator, to ensure the
positivity of the output, we use Leaky Sigmoid as the activation function of the output layer. It is
defined as LeakySigmoidβ(z) =
1
1+e−x1(x ≤ β) +
[
e−β
(1+e−β)2 × (x− β) + 11+e−β
]
1(x > β). Its shape is
similar to Sigmoid, but its range is [0,+∞]. We train the first 100 epochs with a learning rate 5× 10−4,
and then we train another 50 epochs with a decreased learning rate 1× 10−4.
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Figure 20: A demonstration of the adversarial networks
Algorithm 3 Training Generative Adversarial Networks
Given the initial condition Xm0 = x0,∀m ∈ [1,M ], and the initial starting point of σ = {σn}N−1,Mn,m=1 :
for epoch = 1 : number of epochs do
Phase 1: train the α-generator
for time step n = 1 : N − 1 do
With the network An, inputs {Xn}Mm=1, parameters {σn}Mm=1, outputs αn,m = An(Xn,m, σn,m);
Xn+1,m = Xn,m exp
{(
αn,m(µ− r) + r − 12α2n,mσ2n,m
)
∆t+ αn,mσn,m∆Wn,m
}
;
end
Loss function L1 = − 1M
∑M
m=1
{
U(XN,m) + λ0
∑N−1
n=1 F (σ
2
n,m)∆t
}
;
Train the neurons with an Adam optimizer and update An, n ∈ [1, N − 1].
Phase 2: train the σ-generator
for time step n = 1 : N − 1 do
With the network Sn, inputs {Xn}Mm=1, parameters {αn}Mm=1, outputs σn.m = Sn(Xn,m, αn,m);
Xn+1,m = Xn,m exp
{(
αn,m(µ− r) + r − 12α2n,mσ2n,m
)
∆t+ αn,mσn,m∆Wn,m
}
;
end
Loss function L2 = 1M
∑M
m=1
{
U(XN,m) + λ0
∑N−1
n=1 F (σ
2
n,m)∆t
}
;
Train the neurons with an Adam optimizer and update Sn, n ∈ [1, N − 1].
end
We now assess the quality of Algorithm 3. We use a utility function U(XT ) = ln(XT ) and a cost function
F (σ2t ) = (σt − σ0)2. Its analytical solution facilitates numerical comparison. Figures 21a compares the
learned value functions with the true values for a range of λ0. It shows good accuracy of the learned
functions versus the true ones. The errors are of magnitude 10−5. The loss function L2 during the
training is presented in Figure 21b. Unlike the trend in training regular deep neural networks, the loss
function is not monotonically decreasing. As we can see, the minimizer was dominating the competition
at the beginning, the loss function decreasing rapidly. Then the maximizer caught up, the loss function
increased for a while and finally converged to the true value.
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(a) value functions estimated with GANs (b) the minimizer’s loss function, λ0 = 10
Figure 21
Despite the promising results, a limitation of GANs, shared with deep neural networks in general, is the
sensitivity of training to the chosen parameters. On difficult problems, fine-tuning the hyper-parameters
of the GAN to facilitate training might require a lot of effort. One standard strategy for stabilizing
training is to carefully design the model, either by adopting a proper architecture (Radford et al., 2015)
or by selecting an easy-to-optimize objective function (Salimans et al., 2016). In spite of this caveat,
GANs can be considered a viable contender to the more classical Monte Carlo methods of subsection
for robust portfolio allocation involving multiple risky assets, and deserve further investigation.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we interpreted a robust portfolio optimization problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic
differential game. We have proven that the value function is the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs equation, and satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle. We compared the
performance of the robust and non-robust portfolios with both Monte Carlo simulation and empirical
market data. Under market shocks, our robust mechanism can prevent huge losses. By choose the λ0
properly, the robust portfolios have a higher expected utility than the non-robust one. In addition to the
finite difference method, we provide control randomization and GANs algorithms to estimate the value
function. These two methods can enrich quantitative techniques for solving robust portfolio optimization
problems. Both of them have demonstrated high accuracy in the numerical results.
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A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First of all, define w(t, x) := supα∈A Et,x
[
U(Xα,ΣT )
]
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R. All the assumptions on
α,U,Xt hold for w(t, x), except that we assume the covariance Σ for time u ∈ [t, T ] is a fixed known
process in B. An argument used in Pham (2009, p.52) proved that, when the utility function U(·) is
continuous, increasing and concave on R, w(t, ·) is also increasing and concave in x, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
For any fixed Σ ∈ B, we define a function q(t, x) by
q(t, x) = sup
α∈A
Et,x
[
U(Xα,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]
,
= w(t, x) + E
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]
.
Then q(t, x) is also concave in x for t ∈ [0, T ]. We define
L(t, x, αt,Σt) := λ0F (Σt) + (α
ᵀ
t µ+ r − αᵀt r)x
∂q
∂x
(t, x) +
1
2
tr
(
αᵀt Σtαtx
2 ∂
2q
∂x2
(t, x)
)
.
In addition to Assumption 2, we know L is convex in Σt and concave in αt. By Zeidler (2013, Theorem
49.A), there exists a saddle point (α∗t ,Σ∗t ) ∈ A×B, such that
inf
Σt∈B
L(t, x, α∗t ,Σt) = L(t, x, α
∗
t ,Σ
∗
t ) = sup
αt∈A
L(t, x, αt,Σ
∗
t ). (34)
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We know from Pham (2009, Chapter 4.3) that q(t, x) is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation
∂q
∂t
(t, x) + sup
αt
L(t, x, αt,Σt) = 0, q(T, x) = U(x).
Then q∗(t, x) := supα∈A Et,x
[
U(Xα,Σ
∗
T ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σ∗s)ds
]
is a viscosity solution of the PDE
∂q
∂t
(t, x) + sup
αt∈A
L(t, x, αt,Σ
∗
t ) = 0,
which is equivalent to
∂q
∂t
(t, x) + inf
Σt∈B
L(t, x, α∗t ,Σt) = 0 (35)
due to the saddle point property (34). Using arguments similar to the ones in Pham (2009, Chapter
4), the function infΣ∈B Et,x
[
U(Xα
∗,Σ
T ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]
is the unique viscosity solution of the HJB
equation (35). Therefore we have
sup
α∈A
Et,x
[
U(Xα,Σ
∗
T ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σ∗s)ds
]
= inf
Σ∈B
Et,x
[
U(Xα
∗,Σ
T ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]
.
With J(t, x, α,Σ) = Et,x
[
U(Xα,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]
, then the inequality
inf
Σ∈B
sup
α∈A
J(t, x, α,Σ) ≤ sup
α∈A
J(t, x, α,Σ∗) = inf
Σ∈B
J(t, x, α∗,Σ) ≤ sup
α∈A
inf
Σ∈B
J(t, x, α,Σ) (36)
implies
inf
Σ∈B
sup
α∈A
Et,x
[
U(Xα,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]
= sup
α∈A
inf
Σ∈B
Et,x
[
U(Xα,ΣT ) + λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds
]
.
From Proposition 1, we have u(t, x) ≤ v(t, x) ≤ v¯(t, x) ≤ u¯(t, x). Combining this with u¯(t, x) = u(t, x),
we obtained the required equalities
u(t, x) = v(t, x) = v¯(t, x) = u¯(t, x).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let XΣ,ΓT and X¯
Σ,Γ
T be the solutions of the SDE (2) with initial states (t, x) and (t, x¯) respectively,
they are both controlled by an arbitrary pair of admissible control and strategy processes (Σ,Γ). From
Assumption 1, we have∣∣∣U(XΣ,ΓT )− U(X¯Σ,ΓT )∣∣∣ ≤ Q(|XΣ,ΓT | , ∣∣X¯Σ,ΓT ∣∣) ∣∣XΣ,ΓT − X¯Σ,ΓT ∣∣ .
We have ∣∣∣Et,x [U(XΣ,ΓT )]− Et,x¯ [U(X¯Σ,ΓT )]∣∣∣ ≤ E∣∣∣U(XΣ,ΓT )− U(X¯Σ,ΓT )∣∣∣. (37)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,(
E
∣∣∣U(XΣ,ΓT )− U(X¯Σ,ΓT )∣∣∣)2 ≤ E[Q(∣∣XΣ,ΓT ∣∣, ∣∣X¯Σ,ΓT ∣∣)2]E[∣∣XΣ,ΓT − X¯Σ,ΓT ∣∣2]. (38)
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It is straightforward to check that there exist constants C, m1,m2 and β0 such that
E
[
Q(
∣∣XΣ,ΓT ∣∣, ∣∣X¯Σ,ΓT ∣∣)2]E[∣∣XΣ,ΓT − X¯Σ,ΓT ∣∣2] ≤ CE[∣∣XΣ,ΓT ∣∣2m1 + ∣∣X¯Σ,ΓT ∣∣2m2]e2β0(T−t) |x− x¯|2 . (39)
By the classical inequality Et,x
[
maxt≤s≤T
∣∣XΣ,Γs ∣∣2m] ≤ CT (1+x2m) (e.g., Pham (2009, Theorem 1.3.15)),
for arbitrary control and strategy processes Γ,Σ, we have∣∣∣Et,x [U(XΣ,ΓT )]− Et,x¯ [U(X¯Σ,ΓT )]∣∣∣ ≤ Φ(|x| , |x¯|) |x− x¯| , (40)
where CT ,m are constants, and Φ is a polynomial function.
Next, for all bounded functions Et,x
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]
and Et,x¯
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X¯
Γ,Σ
T )
]
,∣∣∣∣infΣ Et,x[λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]
− inf
Σ
Et,x¯
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X¯
Γ,Σ
T )
]∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
Σ
∣∣∣∣Et,x[λ0 ∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]
− Et,x¯
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X¯
Γ,Σ
T )
]∣∣∣∣, (41)∣∣∣∣sup
Γ
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]
− sup
Γ
Et,x¯
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X¯
Γ,Σ
T )
]∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
Γ
∣∣∣∣Et,x[λ0 ∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]
− Et,x¯
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X¯
Γ,Σ
T )
]∣∣∣∣. (42)
Under Assumptions 1 and 3, v¯(t, x) is bounded. Then we can write the difference between the two value
functions as: ∣∣∣v¯(t, x)− v¯(t, x¯)∣∣∣ (43)
≤ sup
Γ
sup
Σ
∣∣∣∣Et,x[λ0 ∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]
− Et,x¯
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X¯
Γ,Σ
T )
]∣∣∣∣. (44)
In addition to the inequality (40), the value function v¯(t, x) is locally Lipschitz continuous in x.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We use localization techniques here. Let Bk = {x ∈ R, x2 < k2}, let φk(x) be a function such
that φk(x) = 1 on Bk, and φk(x) = 0 outside Bk. Then we can define a new process
dXks = φk(X
k
s )X
k
s
[
(αᵀsµ+ r − αᵀsr)ds+ αᵀsσsdWs
]
, (45)
starting from an initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. Let Uk(x) = φk+2(x)U(x), then we can define the
truncated value function by
v¯k(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U
k(Xk,Γ,ΣT )
]}
. (46)
In the above setting, the drift and volatility functions in the SDE (45) are bounded, and the utility
function in (46) is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. Since all assumptions of Fleming and Souganidis
(1989) are satisfied, the localized value function v¯k defined in (46) satisfies the dynamic programming
principle: for t ≤ t+ θ ≤ T ,
v¯k(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ t+θ
t
F (Σs)ds+ v¯
k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ,Σt+θ )
]}
. (47)
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In this proof, Xk,Γ,Σt+θ and X
Γ,Σ
t+θ are the solutions of SDE (45) and SDE (2) respectively, both starting
from (t, x), controlled by processes Γ,Σ for the time u ∈ [t, t+ θ].
As k →∞, v¯k(t, x) defined in (46) approaches v¯(t, x) defined in (7), then our problem reduces to proving
that the right hand side of (47) converges to the right hand side of (11).
Note that if Xks is in Bk+1, then Xku is in Bk+1 ∀u ∈ [s, T ] almost surely. Define τk to be the first exit
time of Xkt from Bk. Thus, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, we have∣∣∣∣ sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ t+θ
t
F (Σs)ds+ v¯
k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ,Σt+θ )
]}
− sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ t+θ
t
F (Σs)ds+ v¯(t+ θ,X
Γ,Σ
t+θ)
]}∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
Γ∈N
sup
Σ∈B
Et,x
∣∣∣∣v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ,Σt+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,XΓ,Σt+θ)∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
Γ∈N
sup
Σ∈B
Et,x
∣∣∣∣(v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ,Σt+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,XΓ,Σt+θ))1(τk > T )∣∣∣∣ (48)
+ sup
Γ∈N
sup
Σ∈B
Et,x
∣∣∣∣(v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ,Σt+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,XΓ,Σt+θ))1(τk ≤ T )∣∣∣∣. (49)
If τk > T , the term (48) is zero. For the term (49), for any arbitrary pair (Γ¯, Σ¯), we have(
Et,x
∣∣∣∣v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,X Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ)1(τk ≤ T )∣∣∣∣)2
≤ Et,x
[∣∣∣∣v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,X Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ)∣∣∣∣2
]
× P(τk ≤ T ). (50)
Finally our task is to show that the upper bound (50) converges to zero as k goes to infinity.
Let Xk,Γ,ΣT be the solution of SDE (45) starting from (t + θ,X
k,Γ¯,Σ¯
t+θ ), and X
Γ,Σ
T be the solution of (2)
starting from (t+ θ,X Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ), they are controlled by Γ,Σ for the time u ∈ [t+ θ, T ].
Using arguments in equations (41) and (42),∣∣∣v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,X Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ)∣∣∣
≤ sup
Γ∈N
sup
Σ∈B
∣∣∣Et+θ,Xk,Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ [λ0 ∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U
k(Xk,Γ,ΣT )
]
− Et+θ,XΓ¯,Σ¯t+θ
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]∣∣∣
For any arbitrary controls (Γ,Σ) for the time u ∈ [t+ θ, T ], it is easy to see that
Et,x
(∣∣∣Et+θ,Xk,Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ [Uk(Xk,Γ,ΣT )]− Et+θ,XΓ¯,Σ¯t+θ [U(XΓ,ΣT )]∣∣∣)
≤ Et,x
(
Et+θ,X
k,Γ¯,Σ¯
t+θ
∣∣∣Uk(Xk,Γ,ΣT )∣∣∣+ Et+θ,XΓ¯,Σ¯t+θ ∣∣∣U(XΓ,ΣT )∣∣∣)
≤ Et,x
(
Et+θ,X
k,Γ¯,Σ¯
t+θ
[
C
∣∣∣Xk,Γ,ΣT ∣∣∣2m1]+ Et+θ,XΓ¯,Σ¯t+θ [C∣∣∣XΓ,ΣT ∣∣∣2m2])
≤ Et,x
(
KT
(
1 +
∣∣∣Xk,Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ ∣∣∣2m1)+KT (1 + ∣∣∣X Γ¯,Σ¯t+θ∣∣∣2m2))
≤ CT
(
1 + |x|2m
)
,
where C,KT , CT ,m1,m2,m are constants. Then there exists a polynomial Φ such that
Et,x
[∣∣∣v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ,Σt+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,XΓ,Σt+θ)∣∣∣2] ≤ Φ(|x|), (51)
29
and the Markov inequality yields
P(τk ≤ T ) ≤
Et,x
[
supt≤s≤T
∣∣XΓ,Σs ∣∣2]
k2
≤ CT
(
1 + x2
)
k2
, (52)
where CT is a constant independent of k. Therefore we have
Et,x
∣∣∣∣(v¯k(t+ θ,Xk,Γ,Σt+θ )− v¯(t+ θ,XΓ,Σt+θ))1(τk ≤ T )∣∣∣∣ ≤ K(
∣∣x∣∣)
k
,
where K(
∣∣x∣∣) is a polynomial function in terms of x.
As k →∞, the term (49) goes to zero as well, therefore
v¯(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ t+θ
t
F (Σs)ds+ v¯(t+ θ,X
Γ,Σ
t+θ)
]}
,
as the left and right hand sides of (47) converge to the left and right hand sides of equation (11)
respectively.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Let XΓ,Σs be the solution of the SDE (2) starting from x at time t, controlled by Γ,Σ for time
u ∈ [t, s]. By the Dynamic Programming Principle and inequality (40), for t < s < T,∣∣v¯(t, x)− v¯(s, x)∣∣ = ∣∣∣ sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
{
Et,x
[
λ0
∫ s
t
F (Σu)du+ v¯(s,X
Γ,Σ
s )
]}
− v¯(s, x)
∣∣∣.
With any arbitrary control and strategy processes (Σˆ, Γˆ) for time u ∈ [t, s], we have∣∣∣Et,x [λ0 ∫ s
t
F (Σˆu)du+ v¯(s,X
Γˆ,Σˆ
s )
]
− v¯(s, x)
∣∣∣ (53)
=
∣∣∣Et,x [λ0 ∫ s
t
F (Σˆu)du
]
+ Et,x
[
v¯(s,X Γˆ,Σˆs )− v¯(s, x)
]∣∣∣ (54)
≤
∣∣∣Et,x [λ0 ∫ s
t
F (Σˆu)du
]∣∣∣+ Et,x [sup
Γ
sup
Σ
(
Es,X
Γˆ,Σˆ
s [U(XΓ,ΣT )]− Es,x[U(XΓ,ΣT ]
)]
. (55)
Referring to (40), there exist a polynomial function Φ and constants C,CT ,m1,m2 for an arbitrary pair
of (Γ,Σ) for time u ∈ [s, T ] such that
Et,x
[
Es,X
Γˆ,Σˆ
s [U(XΓ,ΣT )]− Es,x[U(XΓ,ΣT )]
]
≤ Et,x
[
Φ(
∣∣X Γˆ,Σˆs ∣∣ , ∣∣x∣∣) ∣∣X Γˆ,Σˆs − x∣∣]
≤ Et,x [Φ(∣∣X Γˆ,Σˆs ∣∣ , ∣∣x∣∣)2]1/2 Et,x [∣∣X Γˆ,Σˆs − x∣∣2]1/2
≤
(
Cx2m1 + CT
(
1 + x2m2
))1/2
Et,x
[∣∣X Γˆ,Σˆs − x∣∣2]1/2.
We know
Et,x
[∣∣X Γˆ,Σˆs − x∣∣2] ≤ CT (1 + x2)(s− t).
Let η = max
{∣∣F (Σu)∣∣ : Σu ∈ B}, therefore∣∣v¯(t, x)− v¯(s, x)∣∣ ≤ λ0η(s− t) + Φ(|x|)(s− t)1/2.
Hence v¯(t, x) is Hölder continuous in t ∈ [0, T ].
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We again make use of the localized processes Xkt , Uk and v¯k from the proof of Theorem 1 in
Section 5. The HJBI equation associated with SDE (45) is{
∂v
∂t (t, x) +H
k(t, x, ∂v∂x (t, x),
∂2v
∂x2 (t, x)) = 0 in [0, T )× R,
v(T, x) = Uk(x) on [T ]× R, (56)
where
Hk(t, x, p,M) = inf
Σ∈B
sup
a∈A
{
λ0F (Σ) + φk(x)(a
ᵀµ+ r − aᵀr)xp+ 1
2
tr
(
φ2k(x)a
ᵀΣax2M
)}
. (57)
All the assumptions in Fleming and Souganidis (1989) are satisfied, so v¯k(t, x) (46) is a viscosity solution
of the HJBI equation (56).
Now we introduce another value function
v˜k(t, x) =
{
v¯k(t, x) ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Bk+1
U(x) + infΣ∈B Et,x[λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds] ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× (R\Bk+1)
.
In the first case where x ∈ Bk+1, we have
(
XkT
)2
< (k + 2)
2 almost surely. Therefore
v˜k(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
Et,x[λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
k,Γ,Σ
T )], ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Bk+1.
Then v˜k(t, x),∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Bk+1 is a viscosity solution of{
∂v
∂t (t, x) +H
k(t, x, ∂v∂x (t, x),
∂2v
∂x2 (t, x)) = 0 in [0, T )× R,
v(T, x) = U(x) on [T ]× R. (58)
Since the drift and diffusion of Xkt are zero outside of Bk+1, then X
k,Γ,Σ
T = x for x ∈ (R\Bk+1) and
v˜k(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
Et,x[λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
k,Γ,Σ
T )], ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× (R\Bk+1) .
It is easy to check that v˜k(t, x),∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× (R\Bk+1) is also a viscosity solution of HJBI equation
(58) with φk(x) = 0. Combining the two cases, we have
v˜k(t, x) = sup
Γ∈N
inf
Σ∈B
Et,x[λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
k,Γ,Σ
T )], on [0, T ]× R,
and v˜k(t, x) is a viscosity solution of (58).
Since Hk → H as k →∞, if we can prove v˜k → v¯ as k →∞, then it shows that v¯ is a viscosity solution
of equation (12). We will prove the convergence in the following way: first of all, we have∣∣∣v¯ − v˜k∣∣∣ ≤ sup
Γ
sup
Σ
∣∣∣∣Et,x[λ0 ∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
]
− Et,x
[
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
k,Γ,Σ
T )
]∣∣∣∣.
For any arbitrary pair of control and strategy processes (Γ,Σ), we have
Et,x
[((
λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T )
)− (λ0 ∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
k,Γ,Σ
T )
))
1(τk ≥ T )
]
= 0. (59)
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Using Assumption 1, we can write∣∣∣∣Et,x[λ0 ∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
Γ,Σ
T ])]− Et,x[λ0
∫ T
t
F (Σs)ds+ U(X
k,Γ,Σ
T )]
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Et,x[(U(XΓ,ΣT )− U(Xk,Γ,ΣT ))1(τk < T )]∣∣∣∣
≤ Et,x
[
Q(
∣∣XΓ,ΣT ∣∣, ∣∣Xk,Γ,ΣT ∣∣)(∣∣XΓ,ΣT ∣∣− ∣∣Xk,Γ,ΣT ∣∣)1(τk < T )]. (60)
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality on the upper bound (60), with similar arguments in (52), we
obtain (
Et,x
[
Q(|XΓ,ΣT | ,
∣∣Xk,Γ,ΣT ∣∣)(∣∣XΓ,ΣT ∣∣− ∣∣Xk,Γ,ΣT ∣∣)I(τk < T )]) 2
≤ CT
(
1 + x2m
)× CT (1 + x2)
k2
. (61)
Hence
Et,x
[
Q(|XΓ,ΣT | ,
∣∣Xk,Γ,ΣT ∣∣)(∣∣XΓ,ΣT ∣∣− ∣∣Xk,Γ,ΣT ∣∣)1(τk < T )] ≤ Φ(|x|)k , (62)
where Φ(|x|) is a polynomial function independent of k. Since (Γ,Σ) are arbitrary, combining (59), (60)
and (62), we deduce that ∣∣∣v¯ − v˜k∣∣∣ ≤ Φ(|x|)
k
.
So v˜k converges to v¯ as k →∞. Thus v¯ is a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation (12).
A.6 Explicit solution of equation (20)
For completeness, we express the real positive root of equation (20) explicitly.
Let c =
(µ− r)2
2λ0
, the discriminant of the equation ∆ = −256c3−27σ40c2 is less than zero, meaning there
are two distinct real roots. It is easy to check that there is one positive and one negative root, and the
real positive one is
σˆ =
σ0
4
+
1
2
σ20
4
+
3
√√
3
√
27σ40c
2 + 256c3 − 9σ20c
3
√
232/3
−
4 3
√
2
3c
3
√√
3
√
27σ40c
2 + 256c3 − 9σ20c

1
2
+
1
2
[
σ20
2
−
3
√√
3
√
27σ40c
2 + 256c3 − 9σ20c
3
√
232/3
+
4 3
√
2
3c
3
√√
3
√
27σ40c
2 + 256c3 − 9σ20c
+
σ30
4
√
σ20
4 +
3
√√
3
√
27σ40c
2+256c3−9σ20c
3√232/3 −
4 3
√
2
3 c
3
√√
3
√
27σ40c
2+256c3−9σ20c
] 1
2
.
32
